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We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms 
on equilibrium R&D projects.  We compare a monopolist’s choice of R&D 
portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer.  We next show that Sah and Stiglitz’s 
finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms 
under Bertrand competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel.  We 
also show that the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular 
research paths can lead to socially excessive R&D diversification.  Lastly, using 
Sah and Stiglitz’s definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which 
larger hierarchies invest in smaller portfolios. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An extensive literature examines the relationship between market structure and research 
and development (R&D) activities, primarily comparing privately and socially optimal 
investment levels, or innovative efforts, along a single dimension.  In practice, however, there are 
many different research paths that a firm might pursue.  Hence, progress also hinges on the 
research directions chosen by firms and the extent to which firms diversify their approaches to 
R&D by pursuing multiple directions simultaneously. 
Many people suspect that a diversity of approaches goes along with a diversity of 
approachers, and antitrust authorities have expressed concern over the effects of mergers, for 
instance, on research diversity.
1  But it is not immediately clear why this should be a concern.  
After all, a single organization can have incentives to pursue diverse approaches.  Put simply, 
why can’t a single organization do everything a group of firms can do, plus take advantage of 
coordination where beneficial?  We answer this question by exploring how market structure and 
organizational structure affect the social portfolio of R&D approaches.   
Joe Stiglitz is no stranger to these issues.  Two lines of Joe’s research are directly on 
point.  One is his work on R&D competition when each firm can pursue multiple paths 
simultaneously.  Sah and Stiglitz (1987) established conditions under which the total number of 
paths pursued in a market is independent of the number of firms.  While provocative, this result 
applies to a limited set of market structures.  Below, we examine several additional settings.  We 
call the influence of market structure on diversity the role of “external factors.” 
                                                 
1   See Robinson (1999) and Rubinfeld and Hoven (2001) on the proposed merger of Lockheed-Northrop and 
Grumman.   2 
Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, and 1988) also provided a second line of directly relevant 
work, this time on organizational design.  Sah and Stiglitz explored how the architecture of an 
economic organization—who collects information, with whom it is communicated, and how 
decisions are made—affects the quality of decision making.  Below, we build on their model of 
hierarchical architectures to examine how firms’ choices of internal organization affect R&D 
diversity.  We call this the role of “internal factors.” 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section II lays out several 
assumptions maintained throughout the analysis.  Section III establishes a benchmark by 
examining a firm that is the sole potential innovator and is a unitary, profit-maximizing decision 
maker.  Section IV examines external factors by considering the interaction of several unitary, 
profit-maximizing decision makers.  Specifically, it examines whether highly concentrated 
industries will predictably give rise to different R&D portfolios than less concentrated industries.  
Section V turns to internal issues and examines how organizational choices interact with market 
structure to affect the equilibrium R&D portfolio. 
II.  OUR CHOICE OF RESEARCH PATH 
Many factors influence firms’ R&D strategies, and to identify diversification incentives 
we begin by eliminating or holding constant potentially confounding influences.  First, with 
product innovation, the value of R&D diversity as a response to uncertainty may become 
confounded with the value of product variety.
2  To avoid this problem, we restrict attention to 
process innovations and assume throughout that each firm has a product of fixed characteristics. 
                                                 
2   There is a large literature on deterministic product selection, which establishes that a monopolist may 
choose greater or less variety than is socially optimal and than would a multi-firm market.  Joe Stiglitz is a 
prominent contributor to this literature.  See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).  See also Katz (1980).   3 
Second, we restrict attention to situations in which R&D activities along different paths 
are substitutes for one another.  We do this because complementarities could introduce 
economies of scope that can separately influence the choice of R&D portfolios.  We define a 
project as a level of effort along a particular R&D path.  We assume that each project, j, gives 
rise to a stand-alone cost level, c
j, and that a firm’s unit cost is equal to the lowest realized cost 




k } when firm i undertakes projects 1 through k. 
Third, we also want projects to be substitutes rather than complements in terms of the 
interaction of effort levels across projects.  Throughout most of the analysis we assume that there 
are no technological spillovers within or across firms: the distribution of results from project j 
undertaken by firm i is independent of the efforts devoted to other projects by firm i or its rivals.
3  
Fourth, we want to distinguish the incentive to diversify R&D paths from incentives for 
firms to choose different types of R&D projects.  The economics literature suggests that 
incumbent firms with market power have stronger incentives than new competitors to invest in 
incremental innovations.
4  Furthermore, a large business strategy literature suggests that 
incumbent firms tend to look to innovate in areas they already know.
5  While theses biases are 
themselves of considerable interest, we focus on diversification narrowly defined in order clearly 
to identify various forces at work.  Thus, we assume that, conditional on the level of effort, each 
                                                 
3   Notice that this assumption does not imply that the resulting cost levels of different projects are 
uncorrelated conditional on the effort levels. 
4   See Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Katz and Shapiro (1987). 
5   Christensen (1997) argues that market leaders in the computer disk drive industry repeatedly failed to 
embrace the next technological revolution because they focused too much on meeting customer demands for 
incremental improvements to existing technologies.  Henderson (1993) invokes organizational factors and 
economic incentives to explain why new entrants in semiconductor photolithography equipment often 
leapfrogged existing market leaders.   4 
of the different substitute projects has the same cost distribution as any other. 
III. UNITARY  MONOPOLY 
We begin by comparing the diversification incentives of a profit-maximizing monopolist 
with those of a total-surplus-maximizing decision maker.  Consider a set of portfolios of R&D 
projects where each portfolio entails the same level of aggregate R&D expenditures.  Each 
portfolio gives rise to a distribution function for the firm’s cost level.  A profit-maximizing 
decision maker chooses the portfolio that maximizes the expected value of π (c), the monopoly 
profits earned with unit production cost level c.   A welfare-maximizing decision maker chooses 
the portfolio that maximizes the expected value of W(c), the sum of profits and consumer surplus 
when the firm chooses the monopoly price corresponding to marginal cost c.  Note that both 
profits and welfare are decreasing functions of c.  Moreover, profits are convex in c; a profit 
maximizer has incentives to take risks with R&D.  Does the firm do so to an efficient degree? 
As is well known, a monopolist facing a downward-sloping demand function undertakes 
too little cost-reducing R&D because a fall in marginal costs leads to an equilibrium increase in 
consumer surplus.  There is not a similarly general result for the monopolist’s attitude towards 
risk.  Define x(p) as the quantity demanded at price p, r(c) as the monopoly price given costs c, 
and x*(c) ≡  x(r(c)).  By the envelope theorem, π '(c) = −  x*(c).  The change in total surplus is 
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*
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 ≥  0 is the pass-through rate.  Suppose that  ) (c ϕ is constant over c, as is the case with linear, 
constant elasticity, or rectangular (i.e., all consumers have the same reservation price) demand.  
Integrating the expression for the derivatives of profits and welfare demonstrates that   5 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( c c W π ϕ α + + = , where α  is a constant.  Therefore, when  ) (c ϕ is constant, profit-
maximizing and welfare-maximizing decision makers have identical preference orderings over 
risky portfolios that require equal R&D expenditures. 
  When the pass-through rate varies with c, profit-maximizing monopolist may have 
different attitudes toward risk in c than a welfare maximizer.  One measure of preferences toward 
risk is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, − u''(x)/u'(x), where u(x) is a payoff 
function.  Twice differentiating the expressions for welfare and profits yields 
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Consider a choice between one R&D portfolio that yields a non-degenerate distribution of 
cost levels and another requiring the same R&D expenditures that yields a particular cost level 
with certainty.  When the pass-through rate everywhere increases with c, the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion is everywhere higher for the profit-maximizing monopolist and thus, 
whenever the welfare maximizer weakly prefers the risky R&D portfolio, so does the profit 
maximizer.
6  Similarly, if the pass-through rate decreases with c, then whenever the profit 
maximizer weakly prefers the risky R&D portfolio, so does the welfare maximizer. 
                                                 
6   This result is a variant of the following result, which applies to two decision makers with monotonically 
increasing, concave objective functions who are choosing between a lottery and a sure thing.  (In our 
setting, two decision makers with monotonically decreasing, convex objective functions choose between a 
lottery and a sure thing.) If one decision maker everywhere has a higher coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
than the other, then if the decision maker with a higher coefficient of absolute risk aversion weakly prefers 
the lottery, so does the decision maker with the lower coefficient.  See, for example, Kreps (1990 at 86).   6 
As is well known, the Arrow-Pratt measure is of limited usefulness for analyzing choices 
between two risky portfolios.  Ross (1981) has proposed a stronger measure for dealing with such 
situations.  Modifying his definition to fit the present setting, W(c) is said to be “strongly more 
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≥ .  If one decision maker is strongly 
more risk loving than the other, then when the second one would choose the riskier of two 
portfolios, so would the first (Ross 1981, Application 1).  Application of this measure generally 
requires consideration of specific demand functions.  However, one can make the following 
observations, which limit the possible nature of any divergence between private and social 
























+ = .  Hence, if ϕ′ (c) > 0, the welfare maximizer 
cannot be strongly more risk loving than the profit maximizer.  Similarly, if ϕ′ (c) < 0, the profit 
maximizer cannot be strongly more risk loving than the welfare maximizer.  
The analysis above compares private and social attitudes toward risk with respect to cost 
realizations.  But to understand any divergence between the privately chosen degree of 
diversification and the social optimum, one must also understand the generally complex 
relationship between riskiness and diversification.  As noted above, a profit-maximizing 
monopolist will—from a social perspective—tend to under-invest in cost-reducing R&D.  To 
distinguish this effort bias from any diversification bias, we assume that the firm has a fixed total 
R&D expenditure of E and we examine the effects of spreading expenditure over additional 
projects.  In choosing the degree of diversification, at least two factors come into play in addition 
to the firm’s attitudes toward risk: (1) different projects are substitutes, and (2) changing the level 
of effort devoted to an R&D project changes its distribution of returns.   7 
Consider the first additional factor.  Because the outputs of successful R&D projects are 
perfect substitutes, there is no incremental private or social value to adding a project whose 
distribution of resulting cost reductions mirrors that of a project already in the firm’s portfolio.
7  
Thus, all else equal, there is value in pursuing negatively correlated projects even if the decision 
maker is risk loving. 
Now focus on the second factor by supposing the outcomes of different projects are 
independent and identically distributed conditional on effort levels, with common distribution 
function G(c|e), where e is the amount of effort devoted to that project.  We normalize the price 
of effort at 1 and assume that there is an additional fixed cost of F per project.  If the optimal 
allocation of effort across k active projects is uniform, then E = k(e+F) and the lowest realized 
cost has density 
1 )) / ( 1 )( / (
− − − −
k F k E c G F k E c kg , where g is the density associated with G. 
A central question is whether differences in attitudes toward risk lead a profit-maximizing 
monopolist to choose a different value of k than would a total-surplus maximizer.  Building on 
yet another line of Joe Stiglitz’s work (Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) and Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1970 and 1971)), one portfolio of projects is said to be riskier than the other if the distribution of 
costs associated with the first portfolio is equal to the distribution of the second plus a mean 
preserving spread.  Unfortunately, characterizing the effects of k on a portfolio’s distribution of 
cost realizations can be difficult because the distribution of returns from each project in a 
portfolio generally varies as total effort is distributed more thinly across projects. 
There is one case in which the private and social portfolio decisions can readily be 
                                                 
7   More precisely, there is no incremental value to a project for which there is no state of the world that occurs 
with positive probability in which that project has a strictly lower cost realization than any other project in 
the firm’s portfolio.   8 
compared: models such as Sah and Stiglitz (1987), in which any project has only two possible 
outcomes, “success” and “failure.”  Suppose that failure leaves a firm’s cost unchanged, while 
success lowers the firm’s marginal cost to c*.  Let ρ (e) denote a project’s probability of success 
given that effort level e is devoted to that project.  We assume throughout this essay that ρ (0) = 0, 
ρ′ (e) > 0, and  ρ″ (e) < 0.  For a fixed level of total R&D expenditure, both the social and private 
programming problems are to allocate the expenditure across projects to maximize the 
probability that at least one project succeeds.  This common program can be expressed as 







) ( 1 min ρ  
  subject  to    E e kF
k
i
i ≤ + ∑
= 1
, 
where k is the total number of projects receiving positive effort.  It immediately follows that: (a) 
attitudes toward risk have no effect on the optimal choice of project diversity, and (b) any 
privately optimal allocation of R&D effort is also socially optimal. 
For the analysis that follows, it is useful to characterize the optimal allocation of effort 
more fully.  Forming the Lagrangian and differentiating yields first-order conditions 
() µ ρ ρ = − ′ ∏
≠ i j
j i e e ) ( 1 ) (       i = 1, 2,…, k  ,     (2) 
where µ  is the multiplier for the budget constraint.  For any two projects i and j receiving positive 









 is strictly decreasing   9 
in e, all active projects must receive the same level of effort.
8  In what follows, we assume that 
this condition is satisfied. 
Now suppose that E is endogenous.  The argument above implies that all active projects 
will receive a common level of effort, e. The firm chooses e and k to maximize expected profits.  
Let π  be the expected incremental profit from a successful project.  The optimal level of effort 
satisfies Equation (2) with µ  = 1/π  and, ignoring integer constraints, the marginal R&D project 
must just break even in equilibrium, 
    e F e e
k + = −
− 1 )) ( 1 )( ( ρ πρ  . 










    .        ( 3 )  
   Making sufficient assumptions about the curvature of ρ (e), there is a unique optimal per-
project effort level, e*.
9  Notice that e* depends on neither k nor π . Finally, define ρ  ≡  ρ (e*). 
IV. EXTERNAL  CONCERNS 
In this section, we examine the interaction of multiple unitary decision makers.  The 
R&D decisions of different firms interact in several ways.  One is through product-market 
competition: successful R&D by one firm affects the returns to R&D that are enjoyed by product-
market rivals.  Other effects can arise when intellectual property rights, such as patents, enable an 
                                                 








′  is strictly increasing in e, the firm undertakes only one R&D project. 











 once from above.   10 
initial innovator to preempt later ones following a similar R&D path or when firms conducting 
R&D compete for scarce inputs, such as trained research personnel. 
Our interest is in how market structure—acting through its influence on the nature of 
these interactions—shapes the market-wide portfolio of R&D projects.
10  As Sah and Stiglitz 
(1987) observed, many models of R&D investment forcibly underestimate the R&D 
diversification that may arise in concentrated market structures by flatly assuming that each firm 
undertakes only a single R&D project.  Sah and Stiglitz emphasized that such an assumption is 
unrealistic and provided a set of circumstances in which a highly concentrated industry 
undertakes the same total number of R&D projects as a more atomistic one.  Below, we 
generalize their result and show how it depends on assumptions made about the interactions 
identified above.  We find that equilibrium R&D diversity generally depends on market structure, 
but in complex ways not well captured by the conventional one-project-per-firm assumption. 
A.  Innovation Competition with Nonexclusive Intellectual Property Rights 
Following Sah and Stiglitz (1987), assume that each of N producers of a homogeneous 
product can pursue one or more cost-reducing R&D projects.  For simplicity, assume that all 
firms have the same constant marginal costs ci = c
0, i = 1, …, N  before any discovery is made.  
The outcomes of the projects are stochastically independent, whether pursued by the same firm or 
by different ones.  Firms draw from an infinite pool of projects, so that the chance of any two 
firms undertaking the same project is nil.  The results of all undertaken projects become common 
knowledge before price or output decisions are made.  As in our earlier example, an unsuccessful 
                                                 
10   By “structure” we mean the underlying tastes and technology.  In much of what follows, we treat the 
number of firms as an exogenously given element of market structure.  This should be viewed as a short 
hand for the endogenous determination of the number of firms as a result of tastes, technology, and possibly 
government policies, such as antitrust.   11 
project leaves a firm’s cost unchanged, while a successful project lowers the firm’s marginal cost 
to 
0 * c c < .  The marginal cost reduction from an additional successful project is zero. 
The intellectual property rights regime is such that successful R&D by one firm neither 
allows other firms to take advantage of the results of that R&D nor precludes other firms from 
making use of their own successful R&D.  We have in mind an environment in which R&D 
projects are protected by trade secrets.  Secrecy prevents a firm from appropriating a rival’s 
successful R&D but does not prevent any firm from exploiting the results of its own R&D.
11  
1. Nash-Bertrand  Competition 
Sah and Stiglitz (1987) showed that the total, market-wide number of R&D projects 
pursued in equilibrium is independent of the number of firms in the industry when firms are 
Nash-Bertrand product-market competitors.  With Bertrand competition and constant marginal 
costs, all producers earn zero profits if more than one firm succeeds at R&D or if all of them fail.  
Firm i earns positive product-market profits, π , if and only if its R&D alone succeeds. 
If firm j engages in kj R&D projects, j =1, 2,…, N, then firm i’s net expected profit is    
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− ) 1 ( ρ is the probability that all projects by other firms fail, and m = F + e* is the cost of an 
optimally scaled R&D project .  With Bertrand competition and constant marginal costs, the 
                                                 
11   This secrecy also makes licensing difficult.  For a discussion of the difficulties of selling information, see 
Arrow (1962 at 614-16).  For a discussion of licensing in the presence of the potential theft of information 
shown to the prospective buyer, see Anton and Yao (1994).   12 
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The Sah and Stiglitz result that the extent of R&D diversity is independent of market structure 
under these conditions is evident from these inequalities: K* is independent of the number of 
firms in the industry.
12  
Consider the productive and allocative efficiency properties of the equilibrium.  An 
important property of Bertrand competition is that if at least one project is successful, all 
equilibrium production is by a firm with the lower cost level, c*.  Thus, production efficiency is 
independent of how the projects are spread across firms.  This property does not hold for other 
forms of product-market competition and, as we will see below, this has important implications 
for the effect of R&D competition on industry costs and welfare.  Turning to allocative 
efficiency, the equilibrium price is lower if two or more firms have successful R&D projects than 
if only one firm does.  Hence, as long as demand is not perfectly inelastic, allocative efficiency 
depends on the distribution of projects across firms.
13 
Before discussing the Sah and Stiglitz invariance result further, we observe that, with 
independently and identically distributed R&D projects, K is a useful measure of R&D diversity.  
When the returns to different R&D projects are correlated to various degrees, the extent of 
diversity also depends on the extent of correlation among the projects firms choose to pursue.  
For the reasons discussed in Section III above, a firm has incentives to pursue a portfolio of R&D 
                                                 
12   When industry demand is perfectly inelastic, one can extend this result to projects that have more than two 
possible outcomes.  The reason is that a project’s value depends only on how much better it is than the next-
most-successful project, regardless of who owns it. 
13   This point is made by Sah and Stiglitz (1987 at 103 and 104).   13 
projects whose returns are negatively correlated.  It is easy to see that, under Nash-Bertrand 
competition with undifferentiated products, there also is an incentive for a firm to choose 
projects with returns negatively correlated with those of rival firms because there is no value in 
being successful if another firm has been successful as well. 
2.  A Perfect Cartel 
The reason for the invariance of the total number of R&D projects in the industry with 
respect to the total number of firms under homogeneous Bertrand competition is that the 
incremental private benefit of a successful R&D project: (a) is zero if there is at least one other 
successful project, whether pursued by the same firm or by another, and (b) is independent of the 
number of firms and the set of unsuccessful projects if it is the unique successful project.  Thus, a 
firm contemplating an incremental project calculates the profitability of the project based on the 
total number of projects in the industry, not on their allocation among firms. 
As we will illustrate with the models of this subsection and the next, the Sah and Stiglitz 
invariance result is not robust to the nature of product-market competition.  Before considering 
these formal models, it is useful to understand intuitively where the result breaks down.  As long 
as any two successful projects are perfect substitutes, one success for a firm makes additional 
successes worthless regardless of the nature of product-market competition.  However, the extent 
to which success by one firm affects the value of success for its rivals does vary with the nature 
of competition.  In particular, under many forms of competition, there is a positive prize 
associated with being one of several firms to have successfully innovated.  Thus, property (a) of 
the Sah-Stiglitz model is not generally satisfied.
14  Turning to property (b), this too does not 
                                                 
14   Sah and Stiglitz (1987 at 107) themselves make this point.   14 
generally hold because other firms will affect the successful innovator’s product-market output 
and price, and in many models a change in the number of rivals (with the same costs as one 
another) will change the value of being a unique successful innovator.  
Consider the polar opposite case from Bertrand competition: firms collude perfectly on 
price.  We continue to assume that firms compete in research and development.    Specifically, 
assume that demand is inelastic at quantity D
0 up to the reservation value v and firms share 
industry revenues vD
0 equally.  Firm i’s expected profit is 
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The inequalities imply that k* is a non-increasing function of  N D /
0 , which clearly falls as N 
rises.  The total industry number of R&D projects is not, in general, invariant to the structure of 
the industry.
15  With our assumed R&D technology, a second success by a given producer is 
worthless to that firm.  However, the value of its first success is now independent of whether 
other firms have succeeded or not.  Moreover, the value of success depends on the producer’s 
share of total output, and each firm’s optimal investment in R&D, k*, is decreasing in the 
number of firms.  Hence, neither property (a) nor (b) of the Sah and Stiglitz model now holds. 
                                                 
15   The equilibrium industry-wide total number of projects is  * Nk K ≡ .  Ignoring integer constraints, the sign 












k k q ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ρ − − ≡ .  The sign is positive if k* is 
sufficiently large and negative if k* and ρ  are sufficiently small. 
   15 
Although the total number of R&D projects can increase with N, expected welfare in this 
example is a non-increasing function of the number of firms in the industry.  Expected industry 
profits (which are equal to expected total surplus in this model) fall as N rises because there is 
less diffusion of a successful innovation.  A firm with lower production costs sells only  N D /
0  
units of output, and thus expected production costs are higher when a given number of R&D 
projects are spread across more firms.  Moreover, each firm’s expected marginal cost of output 
rises with the number of firms because each firm undertakes fewer R&D projects.  Thus, while 
more firms may contribute to greater R&D diversity as measured by the total number of projects, 
expected total surplus falls and expected production costs rise. 
Because the firms do not compete in price with one another in this assumed cartel, 
licensing would be jointly profitable.  Above, we implicitly assumed that informational 
asymmetries and the intellectual property rights regime make such licensing infeasible.  
However, under different informational and property right assumptions, the invariance result 
would reappear.  Specifically, the number of R&D projects would be independent of the number 
of firms if: (1) a monopoly licensor could fully extract the value of its innovation from its 
licensees, and (2) two or more successful innovators would compete in the licensing market in 
Nash-Bertrand fashion, driving the equilibrium license fee to zero.  When conditions (1) and (2) 
are satisfied, properties (a) and (b) of the Sah-Stiglitz model hold.  Condition (1) is necessary 
because a firm fully internalizes the benefits of innovation for its own sales, which are a function 
of N, while the total benefits of industry-wide licensing are independent of N. 
3. Nash-Cournot  Oligopoly 
Suppose the N firms are Nash-Cournot competitors in the product market.  Unlike a 
perfect cartel, a firm’s payoff from innovation depends on the number of other firms that   16 
innovate successfully.  Unlike Bertrand competition, the firm’s payoff from innovation can be 
positive even if it shares the market with other successful innovators. 
Assume that N firms sell a homogeneous product with linear inverse demand with 
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In a Cournot oligopoly, firm i’s profit depends on the average of all other active firms’ costs and 
does not depend upon how those costs are distributed among its rivals.  Let  i c−  be the expected 
value of  i c−
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If firm i undertakes ki R&D projects, its expected profit net of R&D expenditures is 
   m k c c E c c E i i i
k
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and the expected benefit to firm i from an additional R&D project is  
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0 π π ρ ρ .     
                                                 
16   We are assuming that all firms are active producers, which is the case for c
0− c* sufficiently small.   17 
In a symmetric equilibrium, each of N firms invests in k R&D projects.  Then 
*) ( ) 1 ( *
0 c c c c
k
j − − + = ρ  for all j = 1,..., N.  Figure 1 shows the total number of R&D projects 
in a symmetric N-firm oligopoly when A = 80, b = 1, ρ  = .1, c
0 = 10, c* = 6, and m = 5.  This 
example ignores integer constraints and assumes projects are divisible.  As Figure 1 shows, total 
investment in R&D has an inverted-U shape.  That is, the equilibrium total number of R&D 
projects reaches a maximum at intermediate levels of market concentration. 
Intuitively, there are two offsetting forces at play as the number of firms rises.  One, as 
the number of firms rises, each firm’s sales fall and, thus, so do the benefits of successful, unit-
cost-reducing R&D.  This effect leads each firm to do less R&D as the number of firms rises.  
Two, unlike the Nash-Bertrand case, each firm can benefit from successful R&D even if other 
firms succeed as well.  This effect can raise the total industry incentives to conduct multiple 
projects.  Up to some number of firms (four in this example), the total industry investment in 
R&D increases.  It falls for larger numbers of firms. 
In the present model, even if an increase in the number of firms leads to a larger total 
number of R&D projects, it leads to (weakly) fewer projects per firm.  Moreover, unlike the 
Nash-Bertrand case, a Nash-Cournot competitor whose R&D succeeds does not serve the entire 
market.  As a result, both firm and industry expected unit costs increase with the number of 
firms, even if the total number of R&D projects and, therefore, the probability of successful R&D 
also increase with the number of firms.  Recall that the perfect cartel equilibrium exhibits a 
similar pattern.  The total number of R&D projects can increase with the number of firms, but 
expected unit costs at the firm and industry levels weakly increase with more firms. 
In contrast to the case of a perfect cartel facing inelastic demand, the beneficial impact on 
prices of an increase in the number of Cournot competitors can outweigh the negative impact on   18 
industry costs.  For the parameter values in the example reported in Figure 1, expected welfare 
increases with N up to six firms, and decreases for larger numbers of competitors. 
B.  Innovation Competition with Exclusive Success or Scarce R&D Inputs 
When innovation is protected through intellectual property laws that grant the right to 
exclude others (e.g., patent), if one firm succeeds along a particular path, then other firms may be 
unable to make use of the results of their R&D if they have followed the same research path.
17  
Thus, when there are finitely many potential paths, or some firms can choose their R&D paths 
after observing the choices of their rivals, the possibility of preemption arises.  We will show 
how preemption can give rise to an incentive to diversify as a “spoiler” strategy. 
Consider a model in which each firm allocates effort along two paths, A and B, each of 
which is a patent race.  While innovations on the two paths are perfect substitutes for reducing 
production costs, a patent for an innovation on one path does not block use of an innovation on 
the other one.  On each path, each firm’s probability of success is an increasing function of its 
own efforts and a decreasing function of its rival’s.  Thus, firm 1 has success probability 
) , ( 2 1
A A e e a  along path A, where 
A
i e  is firm i’s effort along path A.  Firm 2 has a symmetric 
success probability,  ) , ( 1 2
A A e e a .  We use analogous notation for path B.  Unlike in the non-
exclusive case, at most one firm can “succeed” on any path. 
Private payoffs are as follows: if one firm succeeds along at least one path and its rival 
succeeds along neither, then gross payoffs are (π
M, 0), where π
M denotes monopoly profits in the 
product market.  If each firm succeeds along a different path, then gross payoffs are (π
D, π
D), 
                                                 
17   We are assuming that a successful innovator has no obligation to share the fruits of its R&D with product-
market rivals and that rival firms cannot use independent invention as a defense to an infringement claim.   19 
where π
D denotes the per-firm duopoly payoffs and 2π
D < π


























A similar expression holds for firm 2.  Hence, the marginal return to e1
A is (using subscripts on 
a(⋅ ,⋅ ) and b(⋅ ,⋅ ) to denote partial derivatives): 
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D] −  1  .  
The term –1 is the direct cost of firm 1’s marginal effort along path A.  The first term 
(beginning with a1) is the expected private value of increasing firm 1’s own success along path 
A, while the term with a2 (recall that a2 < 0) captures the private value of reducing firm 2’s 
probability of succeeding along path A, which is valuable to firm 1 in the event that firm 1 
succeeds along B.  The term with a2 is a raising-rival’s-cost effect: firm 1 tries to succeed along 
path A in part in order to stop firm 2 from doing so.  This component of firm 1’s private benefit 
is proportional to firm 1’s probability of success along path B.  Note that  
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Thus, there is a private complementarity between success on A and success on B.  Intuitively, if a 
firm knows it is going to succeed along one path, it has strong private incentives to succeed along 
the other in order to protect the profits it can earn from being the unique successful innovator. 
In contrast to the private incentives, there is a social substitutability between success 
along path A and success along B.  If the firm succeeds along path A, there is no social value to 
the firm’s succeeding along path B as well because there is no incremental cost reduction.  The 
                                                 
18   For simplicity, in this subsection we assume F = 0.   20 
private complementarity can create a private incentive to diversify along both paths even if the 
technology of R&D is characterized by increasing returns to effort along any one path so that 
specialization would be efficient.  Moreover, with non-exclusive success, increasing returns to 
R&D would give rise to private incentives to specialize efficiently. 
Similarly to preemptive patenting, a firm can have incentives to diversify its projects in 
order to raise rivals’ R&D costs.  If some inputs for R&D have upward sloping supply curves, 
then a firm may expand its R&D along a particular path to make R&D more expensive for its 
competitors, and thereby decrease their probabilities of success along that path. 
V. INTERNAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
So far, we have assumed that firms behave as unitary decision makers acting to maximize 
profits subject to market competition.  This is, at best, an approximation; a well-run firm solves a 
complex multi-layer principal-agent problem and can thus be viewed as maximizing profits 
subject to many constraints, only some of which come from product-market competition.  In the 
present section, we briefly examine the effects of various private responses to the need to 
aggregate and exchange information within an organization in order to make decisions. 
To focus on the influence of organizational design on the choice of R&D portfolios, we 
first consider a setting in which the equilibrium number of R&D projects is independent of the 
number of firms, holding organizational structure constant across firms, and we examine how 
changing the organizational structure affects the equilibrium number of R&D projects.   
Similar to the first model of Section IV, consider a market in which firms are Nash-
Bertrand competitors in the product market and choose among stochastically independent 
projects, each of which has only two possible outcomes, success and failure.  In contrast to our 
earlier model, assume that there are two classes of R&D projects: “good” and “bad.”  A good   21 
project has a probability of success, ρ (e) > 0 for all e > 0 and ρ (0) = 0, while a bad project has a 
zero probability of success for any level of effort. 
Suppose the manager choosing whether to undertake an R&D project believes that a 
fraction ω∈ (0,1) of the projects proposed by the organization’s staff are good.  Let π  be the prize 
from having the sole successful project.  As earlier, the prize is 0 if two or more firms have 
successful projects.  The expected incremental value of a marginal project is equal to  
max ωρ (e)Hπ  −  e −  F  , 
             e    
where H is the probability that all other projects (of that firm or any other) fail. Inserting ω into 
the derivation in Section III, the optimal level of effort per project, e* is given by Equation (3) 
and is independent of ω and π . 
In a symmetric equilibrium with K projects, H = (1 −  ωρ )
K− 1, where as before ρ  ≡  ρ (e*). 
When ωρπ  > F + e*, it is profitable for at least one firm to engage in R&D and, ignoring integer 
constraints, the equilibrium number of projects satisfies 
ωρ (1 −  ωρ )
K− 1π  = F + e* = m,      ( 4 )  
As expected, the equilibrium number of projects is independent of N. 
In what follows, it is useful to understand the relationship between the equilibrium 
number of R&D projects, K*, and the probability that a project is good, ω.  We can examine this 
relationship by taking the natural logarithm of the condition for the equilibrium number of 
projects and totally differentiating with respect to ω: 
   0 * ) 1 ln(
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Hence,   22 
   










      ( 5 )  
The denominator is negative, and the sign of 
ω d
dK * is equal to the sign of 1 −  ωρ K*. 
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.     (6) 
Because 0 < ωρ  < 1, the first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (6) sum to a positive 
number and the denominator of the third term is negative.  By Equation (4), m < ωρπ  and thus 
the third term is negative. 
 If  π  is sufficiently large, the sum of the three terms is negative.  Hence, given any positive 
value of ωρ , if π  is sufficiently large, then a change in organizational design that increases ω will 
result in fewer equilibrium R&D projects industry wide.  In other words, an increase in the 
effectiveness of project selection will reduce equilibrium R&D diversity.  Conversely, for any 
admissible value of ωρ , if π  is sufficiently close to 
ωρ
m  from above, the sum of the three terms is 
positive.  Hence, for a given value of ω, if π  is sufficiently close to 
ωρ
m  from above, an increase in 
the effectiveness of project selection will result in greater equilibrium R&D diversity. 
While the equilibrium number of projects undertaken may rise or fall with ω, the 
equilibrium probability that at least one project will succeed always rises.  The reason is as 
follows.  From Equation (4), (1 −  ωρ )
K*− 1 is equal to 
πρ ω
m , which falls as ω rises.  The probability 
that all projects fail is (1 −  ωρ )
K* = (1 −  ωρ )(1 −  ωρ )
K*− 1.  Because both factors on the right-hand 
side of this equality fall as ω rises, the probability that all projects fail must fall as ω rises.   23 
 Thus far, we have taken ω to be exogenous.  However, various aspects of organizational 
design affect an enterprise’s ability to pursue a favorable selection of R&D projects.  One 
element is the extent to which internal reward structures align employee incentives with those of 
shareholders.  Suppose, for example, that the R&D staff in an organization have very low-
powered incentives.  Then the technical staff may propose “bad” projects because these projects 
generate utility to the staff as interesting research problems even though they hold no commercial 
promise.  Conversely, in an organization that has compensation and promotion schemes that 
align the incentives of R&D staff with those of stockholders, higher-level managers can correctly 
assume that a higher percentage of projects advanced by the technical staff are good projects. 
A second factor is how the organization aggregates diverse information and views held by 
different members of the organization.  The design of organizations to accomplish this task was 
the subject of an important line of research reported in Sah and Stiglitz (1985, 1986, and 1988).  
Here, we analyze a model building on this line of research.  Firms choose from the same, 
infinitely large pool of potential projects.  When a firm chooses a project, the firm can expend 
resources to evaluate the project before committing effort to it.  Unlike in Sah and Stiglitz, 
projects are substitutes for one another and, thus, there are declining incremental social and 
private values of undertaking additional projects. 
An organization chooses how many evaluations of a proposed R&D project to conduct.  
Each evaluation incurs a cost, s, to obtain a binary signal of whether the project is good or bad.  
We say that an evaluator “approves” a project when the signal indicates that the project is good.  
The probability that a single evaluator will approve a project is γ if the project is in fact good and 
β  if the project is in fact bad.  We assume that evaluations are informative (i.e.,  γ > β ) and that 
the evaluations are independent of one another conditional on the true type of the project.   24 
As defined by Sah and Stiglitz, under an L-level hierarchy, a project is evaluated 
sequentially and a negative evaluation at any point leads to the project’s being rejected without 
any further evaluation.  Thus, a project is accepted if and only if all L levels of the hierarchy give 
it a positive evaluation.  When ω0 is the prior probability that a project is good, if the project has 
been approved by an L-level hierarchy, then the posterior probability that the project is good is 
















0  . 
Note that ω(L) goes to 1 as L goes to infinity, and ω(L) goes to ω0 as L goes to 0. 
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times.  The fraction of proposed projects that a L-level hierarchy will deem good and therefore 
eligible for investment is 
L L β ω γ ω ) 1 ( 0 0 − + .  Consequently, the evaluation cost per approved 
project in an L-level hierarchy is 
L L
L s




0 0 − +
, which is an increasing function of L.  The 
expected evaluation cost per undertaken project increases with the number of levels in the 
hierarchy because each project has to be reviewed at each level and the organization has to sort 
through a larger number of projects to select one in which to invest. 
Evaluation costs are in addition to per-project R&D costs, F + e*(L), where e*(L) 
satisfies   25 
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By the concavity of ρ (⋅ ), e*(L) is increasing in L.  Hence, the sum of the effort and evaluation 
costs per undertaken project, 
L L
L s
L e F L m




) ( * ) (
0 0 − +
+ + ≡ , is increasing in L.  An 
additional level increases the probability that R&D projects approved for investment will 
succeed, but the cost per undertaken project also rises.
20 
Suppose there are N hierarchies, each of which has L levels.  Define ρ *(L) ≡  ρ (e*(L)).  
Generalizing our earlier discussion of the Bertrand case, if the firms undertake a total of K 
projects, no firm can increase its expected profits by screening one more or one fewer project if  
  () () π ρ ω ρ ω π ρ ω ρ ω
K K L L L L L m L L L L ) ( * ) ( 1 ) ( * ) ( ) ( ) ( * ) ( 1 ) ( * ) (
1 − ≥ ≥ −
− . 
Thus, ignoring integer constraints, 
() ) ( ) ( * ) ( 1 ) ( * ) (
1 * L m L L L L
K = −
− π ρ ω ρ ω   . 
As before, the equilibrium number of R&D projects under Bertrand competition is independent 
of the number of firms in the industry holding L fixed.  The number of projects does, however, 
depend on the size of the hierarchies, which may itself depend on the number of firms. 
Our analysis above identifies several effects on R&D from increasing the number of 
layers in each hierarchy.  The net result depends on technological parameters.  Figure 2 reports 
the results of simulations with ω0 = 0.2, γ = 0.6, β  = 0.4, and π  = 300 under the assumption that 
                                                 
19   This result is another application of the derivation in Section III and implicitly assumes sufficient curvature 
of ρ (e) to ensure that a unique solution exists. 
20   Moreover, if—unlike the present model—there is a limited number of good projects, then a firm’s 
mistakenly rejecting a good project, which becomes more likely as L increases, will be costly.   26 
the scale of R&D projects is technologically fixed such that F + e*(L) = 5 and ρ *(L) = 0.1 for all 
L.  The figure illustrates the equilibrium outcome for various levels of the cost per evaluation, s.  
Given these parameters, for small values of L, π  is sufficiently close to 
) ( * ) ( L L
m
ρ ω
 from above 
that 
ω d
dK *is positive.  For larger values of L, however, 
ω d
dK *is negative.  When there are no per-
project evaluation costs (s = 0), an increase in L increases the probability of success for each 
project actually undertaken and, from our earlier result, increases the total probability that R&D 
is successful for the market as a whole.  Furthermore, for small hierarchies, the numerator in 
Equation (5) is positive and the total number of R&D projects in the market increases with the 
number of layers in each hierarchy.  However, the results change dramatically when project 
evaluations are costly.  For example, when s = 0.8, the total number of R&D projects and the 
total probability of successful R&D fall with the number of layers in each hierarchy, and firms do 
not do any R&D at all if the number of levels in the hierarchies exceeds 2. 
Although we have treated the number of hierarchical levels as given, in practice each firm 
chooses the number of levels in its organization.  We next briefly explore some of the forces at 
work.  We show that, under the assumption that the scale of R&D projects is technologically 
fixed at e* with success probability ρ , a larger reward for successful innovation leads firms to 
invest in (weakly) more layers of hierarchy. 
Suppose there is a fixed cost of S per level of hierarchy within an organization in addition 
to the per-evaluation cost, s.  A firm’s choice of k and L can be broken into two steps.  For any 
given probability of success, 1−α , the firm chooses k and L to 
   m i n   km(L) + LS 
    subject to  [1 – ρω (L)]
k ≤  α     .        ( 7 )    27 
The firm then chooses α  to maximize (1−α )π  −  Φ (α ), where Φ (α ) is the optimized value of the 
objective function in the sub-problem above and π  is the prize associated with having at least one 
successful project.
21  By standard revealed preference arguments, Φ (⋅ ) is a non-increasing 
function and the firm’s choice of α  is non-increasing in π . 
We next examine the comparative statics of L varying α  exogenously.
22  It will be 
convenient to define θ(L) ≡  ln [1 – ρω (L)] and write Inequality (7) as k θ(L) ≤  ln α . 
  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the choice of k and L include 
    [] 0 ) ( ) ( = + L L m k ϑθ             ( 8 )  
and 
    [] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ' = + + L k L km S L ϑθ     ,      (9) 
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≡ .  By construction,  ) , ( 2 1 L k′ satisfies the constraint in the firm’s program when the 
                                                 
21   The value of π  depends both on the nature of product-market competition and the intensity of R&D 
competition that the firm faces.  Here, our reduced form allows for arbitrary forms of product competition 
and assumes that the firm makes its R&D decisions holding its rivals’ R&D strategies fixed.   28 
failure probability is α 1, and  ) , ( 1 2 L k′ satisfies the constraint when the failure probability is α 2.  
The optimality of (k1, L1) and (k2, L2) implies 
S L L m k S L L m k 1 1 1 2 2
'
1 ) ( ) ( + ≥ +  
and 
S L L m k S L L m k 2 2 2 1 1
'
2 ) ( ) ( + ≥ +   . 
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging terms yields 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
'
2 1 2 2
'
1 L m k k L m k k − ≥ −     .      (12) 
Using the definitions of the
'
i k and the fact that the constraint in the firm’s program is satisfied 























α α     .      (13) 
By hypothesis, 0 < α 1 < α 2.  Thus, the first term in square brackets is negative. Hence, the 






 is increasing in 
L (recall that m(⋅ ) is a positive, increasing function, while θ(⋅ ) is a negative, decreasing 
function).
23  Therefore, Inequality (13) can be satisfied only if L1 ≥  L2. 
Now return to our earlier model of a perfect cartel of N firms with no licensing.  In that 
model, π  is a decreasing function of N and the analysis above establishes that the equilibrium 
value of L is non-increasing in N.  Intuitively, as N rises, each firm conducts less R&D and has 
fewer projects over which to spread the fixed costs of hierarchy.  Hence, with fewer firms, firms 
will invest in more layers of hierarchy, and engage in more accurate project evaluations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
22   We ignore integer constraints, and the analysis provides a heuristic examination of the forces at work.   29 
The analysis also suggests that in a model of Bertrand competition with differentiated 
products and asymmetric market shares, the firms with larger shares—and thus larger potential 
gains from successful cost-reducing innovation—will invest in larger hierarchies.  The possibility 
that smaller firms will choose smaller hierarchies raises a number of interesting issues about the 
types of research conducted by small and large firms within an industry. 
VI. CLOSING  REMARKS 
Drawing inspiration from some of Joe’s pathbreaking work, we have explored how both 
external and internal factors might affect firms’ R&D portfolios.  Much work remains to be done.  
We hope that this essay—written by a modified hierarchy that at times threatened to become a 
Sah and Stiglitz polyarchy
24—will be instrumental in stimulating that work by developing some 
promising paths along which others may proceed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
23   Again, this is a heuristic argument because Equation (8) need hold only at the respective optima. 
24   Projects within this essay were sequentially evaluated and were rejected if they received two negative 
evaluations.  In a polyarchy, a project is accepted as soon as it receives a favorable evaluation.   30 
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Figure 2.  Dependence of total number of R&D projects on the number of hierarchy levels 